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Abstract 
Purpose: Shortcut behaviors are methods of completing a task that require less time than 
typical or standard procedures. These behaviors carry the benefit of increasing efficiency, yet can 
also carry risks (e.g., of an accident). The purpose of this research is to understand the reasons 
individuals engage in shortcut behaviors, even when doing so is known to be risky.  
Design/methodology/approach: We present two laboratory studies (N = 121 and N = 
144) in which participants performed an air traffic control simulation. Participants could improve 
efficiency by taking shortcuts; that is, by sending aircraft off the prescribed flight paths. This 
design allowed for direct and unobtrusive observation of shortcut behaviors. 
Findings: Individuals who were told that efficiency was an obligation tended to believe 
that shortcut behaviors had utility for managing high workloads, even when the risks associated 
with shortcuts were high. Downstream, utility perceptions were positively related to actual 
shortcut behavior. 
Implications: Although communicating risks may be used to help individuals balance the 
“pros” and “cons” of shortcut behaviors, goal framing is also important. Subtle cues indicating 
that efficiency is an obligation can lead to elevated perceptions of the utility of shortcut 
behaviors, even when engaging in shortcut behaviors is very risky.  
Originality/value: Past research has provided limited insights into the reasons individuals 
sometimes engage in shortcut behaviors even when doing so is known to be risky. The current 
research speaks to this issue by identifying workload and obligation framing as antecedents of 
the decision to take shortcuts. 
Key words: shortcut behaviors, utility, obligations, motivation, goals
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Work is often characterized by competing demands, stringent deadlines, and interruptions 
(Mitchell, Harman, Lee, & Lee, 2008). Consequently, employees sometimes take shortcuts to 
manage demands on their time (Hannah & Robertson, 2015; Parks, Ma, & Gallagher, 2010; 
Sekerka & Zolin, 2007). We define shortcut behaviors as the use of methods or means for 
completing a task that require less time than typical or standard procedures. For example, 
assembly line workers develop shortcuts to keep up with the fast pace of the line. Likewise, a 
department store employee may stand on a chair to reach merchandise on a high shelf rather than 
taking the time to get a ladder.  
Existing research has generally characterized shortcut behaviors as undesirable or 
maladaptive, typically regarding them as instances of unsafe (e.g., Christian, Bradley, Wallace, 
& Burke, 2009) or counterproductive work behaviors (e.g., Sackett, 2002). However, shortcuts 
are not inherently unsafe or counterproductive; rather, they provide a mix of benefits and risks. 
On the one hand, shortcut behaviors allow work to be done more quickly and efficiently. Yet, at 
times shortcut behaviors can result in low quality work and can even be unsafe (Komaki, 
Barwick, & Scott, 1978; Weyman & Clarke, 2003). To understand when and why individuals 
engage in shortcut behaviors, it is important to understand how individuals balance the perceived 
risks and potential benefits. The current research is designed to address this issue by considering 
contextual factors that can serve to increase and decrease the occurrence of shortcut behaviors.  
One factor that likely plays a key role is the degree of risk that is perceived to be 
associated with the shortcut behavior. Indeed, individuals often weigh the risks involved before 
engaging in a course of action (e.g., Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Brewer et al., 2007). Yet, it is 
important to recognize that perceived risk alone may not be sufficient to dissuade shortcut 
behaviors. As a vivid example, consider the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. Prior to 
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the explosion, a decision was made to use seawater rather than heavy mud as a drilling fluid. 
Using seawater was faster than using heavy mud; however, it was well known to be a highly 
risky procedure (Reader & O’Conner, 2014). In the case of Deepwater Horizon, the result of the 
shortcut behavior was a catastrophic explosion and one of the largest man-made environmental 
disasters in history. Unfortunately, little is known regarding the factors that drive individuals to 
engage in shortcut behaviors even when doing so is known to be very risky. This is a significant 
limitation, as it is necessary to thoroughly understand the processes that gives rise to risky 
shortcut behavior in order to design and implement effective interventions and policies. The 
current manuscript seeks to address this gap.  
Drawing on theories of behavioral self-regulation we posit that individuals will be 
particularly prone to use shortcut behaviors when managing high workloads. This is because the 
time and efficiency benefits provided by shortcut behaviors may be seen as essential for 
completing large amounts of work in relatively short periods of time. More importantly, we draw 
on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) to predict that individuals who feel an obligation to 
meet their efficiency goals will be particularly sensitive to workload demands and, as such, will 
be particularly willing to do “whatever it takes” to reach their goals. Importantly, this can include 
engaging in shortcut behaviors, even when those behaviors are perceived as highly risky. This is 
an important contribution, as it demonstrates that subtle changes in the way work goals are 
communicated can lead shortcut behaviors to become disassociated from risk perceptions. 
Utility as a Proximal Determinant of Shortcut Behaviors 
Psychological utility (or simply “utility”) is a subjective perception of the usefulness of a 
behavior or set of behaviors at a given point in time (e.g., Kanhenman & Tversky, 1984; Vroom, 
1964). In the current manuscript we are interested in the utility of using shortcut behaviors in lieu 
Shortcut Behaviors 5 
 
of prescribed or “by the book” procedures to accomplish one’s work goals. Although theories 
vary in their precise formalization of the antecedents of utility, most models share the general 
view that utility is a function of the gains or benefits that one expects by engaging in the 
behavior and the losses or costs one expects to accrue by engaging in the behavior (Steel & 
König, 2006). Thus, the motivational pull of an action can be described as the difference between 
the “pros” associated with the behavior and the “cons” associated with the behavior as a function 
both of the probability and value of possible outcomes. In the following sections we present our 
predictions regarding sources of utility of engaging in shortcut behavior.  
Yet, before presenting these predictions it is important to note that utility perceptions are 
a proximal determinant of behavior. A great deal of empirical research has found that utility 
perceptions predict the likelihood that a person will engage in one course of action over another 
(Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Drawing on this theory and research, we predict that utility will be 
a proximal determinant of shortcut behaviors. That is, perceived utility associated with shortcut 
behaviors will be positively related to the actual amount of shortcut behavior in which an 
individual engages (H1).  
Risk as an Antecedent of Utility  
 Arguably the more interesting questions concern the factors that shape perceptions of the 
utility of shortcut behaviors. First, we predict that individuals use risk perceptions to determine 
the utility of engaging in such behaviors. Perceived risk is the expectation that engaging in a 
shortcut behavior will result in a negative outcome (e.g., Cree & Kelloway, 1997). For example, 
a computer programmer who saves time by writing code without documentation may do so 
because she believes a negative outcome (e.g., being unable to understand the code later, being 
reprimanded by a superior) is unlikely to occur as a result of the behavior. Drawing on risk 
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homeostasis theory (Stetzer & Hofmann, 1996; Wilde, 1988), we predict there will be a negative 
relationship between the risks associated with shortcut behaviors and the perceived utility of 
engaging in shortcut behaviors. Specifically, risk homeostasis theory predicts that individuals 
possess a “set-point” for a level of risk they are willing to accept and adjust their behavior 
accordingly to manage risk. As such, when the risks associated with shortcut behavior are 
perceived to be high individuals are expect to reduce the amount of shortcut behavior in which 
they engage. Furthermore, the perceived risks associated with a particular action (e.g., 
vaccinations) are often negatively correlated with the perceived benefits of the action (Alhakami 
& Slovic, 1994). As such, in general we predict there will be a negative relationship between 
perceived risks associated with shortcut behaviors and the perceived utility of those behaviors. 
 Yet, we expect the relationship between risk and utility will be more complex than a 
simple linear relationship. This is because there is evidence that high risks associated with 
shortcut behaviors may be insufficient to fully reduce the utility of engaging in shortcut 
behaviors. For example, as described above, prior to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil 
rig a decision was made to use seawater as drilling fluid, despite the risks this procedure 
introduced (Reader & O’Conner, 2014). Similarly, Weyman and Clarke (2003) identified several 
shortcut behaviors which were routinely used by coal mine workers, despite the workers’ 
knowledge that the behaviors were highly risky. These included standing on conveyor belts, 
riding on conveyor belts, and walking under unsupported areas of the mine. Likewise, Komaki et 
al. (1978) found workers in an industrial bakery frequently took shortcuts on the job, such as 
climbing over conveyors (rather than walking around) and carrying too many trays at once. 
These behaviors occurred even after they had been provided training articulating the risks 
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involved. What might drive individuals to engage in shortcut behaviors even when doing so is 
recognized as very risky? 
We propose that the utility of engaging in shortcut behaviors will depend on two 
additional factors: (1) workload demands, and (2) goal framing. That is, although we predict a 
negative main effect of risk level on utility, this main effect is expected to be qualified by the 
presence of a three-way interaction between risk, workload demands, and goal framing on utility 
(H2). In the following sections we elaborate on the precise form of this interaction. First we 
present our predictions regarding the perceived utility of engaging in shortcut behaviors in low 
risk situations, followed by our predictions regarding high risk situations.  
Utility when Risks are Low  
When the risks associated with shortcut behaviors are low shortcut behaviors are 
expected to hold  great deal of utility. This is because shortcut behaviors save time and therefore 
increase the rate of progress a person is able to make toward his or her goals. In general 
individuals prefer making rapid versus slow progress toward their goals (Johnson, Howe, & 
Chang, 2012). As such, we do not expect workload or goal frame to have significant influences 
on utility when risks are low. Shortcuts yield the benefit of faster velocity, and when risks are 
low, this increased velocity comes at little to no cost (i.e., little chance of a negative outcome). 
Thus, when risks are low we expect shortcuts to have high utility, regardless of the workload 
level or the way work goals are framed.  
Utility when Risks are High  
On the other hand, when the risks associated with shortcut behaviors are high we expect 
the utility associated with shortcut behaviors to be reduced, relative to when risks are low. Yet, 
as reviewed above, there may be situations where shortcut behaviors continue to hold utility even 
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when risks are high. We identify workload and goal framing as potential sources of variation in 
the perceived utility of engaging in shortcut behaviors in high risk situations. Below we discuss 
these factors in turn.  
 Workload. Workload demands refer to the amount of work needing to be accomplished 
in a set amount of time. To begin, consider situations where the risks associated with shortcut 
behaviors are high, yet workloads are low. Under such a scenario the additional velocity 
provided by shortcut behaviors is unlikely to be necessary to achieve one’s goals in the available 
time. That is, there is little need to save time by engaging in shortcut behaviors. Thus, when risks 
are high and workload is low, the costs of engaging in shortcut behaviors likely outweigh any 
benefits, thereby resulting in low perceived utility. In contrast, when workloads are high, 
shortcuts may continue to hold utility even if they are perceived as being highly risky. Shortcut 
behaviors can be employed as a strategy to accomplish large amounts of work within relatively 
short deadlines, and high workloads accentuate the need for fast, efficient performance. As such, 
when workloads are high there can be considerable benefit to engaging in shortcut behaviors.  
 Nonetheless, the benefits of shortcut behaviors must be weighed against the costs. 
Situations characterized by high risks and high workloads create a tension between managing 
efficiency and risk. In such a scenario, shortcut behaviors are not clearly “good” or “bad,” but 
instead the utility of shortcut behaviors is open to a great deal of interpretation. As such, 
although we expect workload to be positively related to utility when the risks associated with 
shortcuts are high, we expect variance in this relationship. To explain this variance, next we turn 
our attention to manner in which efficiency goals are framed. 
 Goal framing. Specifically, we propose that framing efficiency as an obligation will lead 
individuals to be particularly sensitive to workload demands. This prediction is derived from 
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regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997). Regulatory focus theory differentiates between two 
critical motivational orientations concerned with meeting obligations (prevention concerns) 
versus pursuing opportunities (promotion concerns). Specifically, framing a goal as an obligation 
communicates that the goal is very important and must be met, even at the expense of other 
goals. Indeed, goals construed as obligations are “shielded” from competing demands (Shah, 
Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002), such that competing goals are less likely to receive attention 
than the obligation goal. Indeed, although individuals with a chronic need to meet obligations 
tend to “play by the rules” and behave safely when things are going well, these same individuals 
have been shown to engage in highly risky behavior to avoid failing to meet their obligations 
(Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). As such, we predict that individuals who see 
efficiency as an obligation will be willing to do whatever it takes—including the use of risky 
shortcuts—to meet the demands placed on them by high workloads. Therefore, when risks are 
high we predict a two-way interaction between workload and goal framing on utility. 
Specifically, workload is expected to be positively related to utility, but only for individuals for 
whom efficiency is framed as an obligation. 
Moderated Indirect Effect of Workload on Shortcut Behavior via Utility 
Recall that in H1 we predicted that utility would be positively related to actual shortcut 
behavior. Also, in H2 we predicted a three-way interaction between risk, workload, and goal 
framing. Specifically, H2 predicted that workloads would be positively related to utility, but only 
when risks where high and for individuals for whom efficiency is framed as an obligation. 
Therefore, by combining H1 with H2, we predict that workload will have a positive indirect 
effect on shortcut behaviors via utility, and that this indirect effect will be moderated by risk 
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level and goal framing (H3). Specifically, the indirect effect will be strongest when risks are high 
and for individuals for whom efficiency is framed as an obligation. 
Overview of Studies 
Below we present the results from two laboratory studies designed to assess the effects of 
risks, workload, and framing efficiency as an obligation on the perceived utility of taking 
shortcuts, as well as actual shortcut behavior. In both studies individuals performed a work 
simulation task in which there was an inherent trade-off between performing as quickly and 
efficiently as possible and performing as safely and risk-free as possible. The studies differed in 
the way risk perceptions and goal framing were manipulated. The designs of the two studies are 
complementary, whereby limitations of one study are addressed by the other.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty-one undergraduate psychology students from a mid-
sized Canadian university participated in this study in exchange for course credit. The sample 
was 61% female with a mean age of 20.57 years (SD = 2.05). Fifty one percent of the 
participants identified themselves as Asian, 29% identified as Caucasian, and the remaining 20% 
identified other races. In addition to course credit participants had the chance to earn a cash prize 
based on their performance, as described below. 
Procedures. This study used a 2 (goal frame: efficiency is an obligation vs. safety is an 
obligation) × 2 (risk level: low vs. high) × 2 (workload: low vs. high) design. Goal frame was a 
between-subjects manipulation, with participants randomly assigned to one of two conditions in 
which either the efficiency goal or the safety goal was framed as an obligation. In contrast, risk 
level and workload were within-subjects manipulations, with all participants exposed to all 
Shortcut Behaviors 11 
 
combinations of low vs. high risk and low vs. high workload. This design resulted in four 
“types” of trials. All participants were exposed to each trial type twice, for a total of eight 
experimental trials and 968 observations (121 participants × 8 trials). The ordering of these 
manipulations was counterbalanced. Each experimental trial lasted 105 seconds. All three 
manipulations are described in more detail below. 
After arrival and providing informed consent individuals completed several demographic 
questions. Next, participants completed a 45-minute training session in which they were 
introduced to an air traffic control task (described in detail below) and the incentive structure. 
Several knowledge checks were embedded in this training, such that individuals were required to 
correctly answer questions about the material they had just seen before moving forward. There 
were also four hands-on practice trials during which participants performed a specific aspect of 
the air traffic control task (e.g., issuing instructions to aircraft). During this training participants 
were introduced to the risk, workload, and goal framing manipulations.  
Task. The same basic task was used in Studies 1 and 2; thus we present the task in 
general here. Participants performed a radar tracking task programmed using the ATC-labAdvanced 
air traffic control simulator (Fothergill, Loft, & Neal, 2009). For the current research a low 
fidelity version of the task was designed in which all aircraft traveled at the same speed and 
moved throughout a two-dimensional coordinate plane rather than three-dimensional space. 
Participants needed to assign directional vectors to aircraft. In both studies participants were paid 
based on the number of aircraft they were able to land. The specific payment rules for each study 
are described in the relevant methods sections. 
A labeled screen shot of the task is shown in Figure 1. Two types of aircraft are shown in 
this figure: outer aircraft and inner aircraft. The outer aircraft flew in circular holding patterns 
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near each of the airports. Participants needed to issue a command to land an outer aircraft. If no 
command was issued, the outer aircraft would continue to fly in a holding pattern and would not 
land by the end of the trial. On the other hand, the inner aircraft automatically followed 
predetermined routes toward one of the four airports on the screen. However, as shown in Figure 
1, the predetermined routes were not very efficient, and if the participant did not give a command 
to the inner aircraft it would not reach its destination by the end of the trial.  
Therefore, to minimize flight times and ensure the aircraft would reach its destination in 
the time available, participants could issue a command to send aircraft on alternative routes. 
These alternative routes could either be on the flight paths or through the shortcut zones. Routing 
aircraft through the shortcut zones was more efficient because the aircraft could “cut corners.” 
Yet, this shortcut behavior came with some risk. Specifically, the more time aircraft spent in the 
shortcut zones, the higher the odds that the aircraft would come too close to another object (e.g., 
a mountain), which we labeled as a near miss. In real-world aviation, such incursions represent a 
safety risk and are widely regarded as a safety violation, regardless of whether an accident 
results. Although, naturally, no lives were on the line in this simulation, the amount of money 
participants were paid (described in detail in each study) was reduced when there was a near 
miss, creating financial incentive to limit near misses. Finally, participants were informed that as 
long as the inner aircraft stayed within the flight paths that a near miss would never occur. Thus, 
by following this procedure, participants could ensure that no negative outcomes would occur, 
but following the procedure was less efficient than taking shortcuts.  
Shortcut behavior. Shortcut behavior was operationalized as the amount of time aircraft 
spent flying through the “shortcut zones” (see Figure 1). Each aircraft’s location on the x-y 
coordinate grid was recorded at each second of the simulation. A “1” or “0” was recorded for 
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each second an aircraft was at an x-y coordinate inside or outside a shortcut zone, respectively. 
The sum of these observations across all aircraft and across the duration of the trial represented 
shortcut behavior during the trial.   
Participant compensation. Participants were compensated based on the number of 
aircraft landed. Specifically, participants earned $0.06 for each inner aircraft landed, meaning 
participants could earn $0.24 per trial by landing inner aircraft. Also, participants earned $0.50 
for each outer aircraft landed, meaning they could earn $2.00 per trial by landing outer aircraft. 
However, participants were informed that they would only be paid for landing outer aircraft if 
they also landed all four inner aircraft during the trial. For example, if during a trial a participant 
landed four inner aircraft and four outer aircraft, he or she would have earned $2.24. However, if 
the participant had landed three inner aircraft and four outer aircraft, he or she would only have 
earned $0.18 for that trial. We set up the incentive structure in this way to represent “primary” vs. 
“secondary” work goals. To realize the highest payments, participants needed to complete their 
primary goal, which was to land all four inner aircraft.  
Compensation was also based on whether or not there was a near miss. If a near miss 
occurred, participants were not paid any money for the trial, regardless of how many aircraft 
were landed. The way near misses were calculated is described in detail below. Participants were 
required to pass several knowledge checks indicating that they understood the compensation 
scheme before they could move on to the experimental trials. On average, participants earned 
$4.13 (SD = $2.78, Min = $0.00, Max = $10.00).1 There was no significant difference in the 
amount participants earned across goal framing conditions (t(119) = .66, p = .509). 
Risk manipulation. Before each trial (and before reporting utility) participants were told 
whether the trial would be low risk or high risk. Risk was manipulated by varying the 
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relationship between a person’s shortcut behavior and the odds of a near miss occurring. During 
half of the trials the risks associated with taking shortcuts were low, and during half the trials the 
risks associated with taking shortcuts were high. The odds of near miss occurring during the low 
and high risk trials were computed using Equations 1 and 2, respectively. These equations are 
plotted in Figure 2. Odds of Near MissLow Risk = � 11+e.1(−short−cut+90)� + .02 (1) Odds of Near MissHigh Risk = � 11+e.1(−short−cut+30)� − .02 (2) 
 The low and high risk trials were explained to participants in detail during the training 
session. Participants were shown the curves presented in Figure 2, although for participants each 
curve was first presented on its own plot for simplicity. These plots were accompanied by 
descriptive text. First, participants were shown a figure with the dashed “low risk” line from 
Figure 2, along with the following text: 
During the Low Risk trials, the relationship between the time spent in the green shortcut 
zones and the odds of a near miss occurring is shown in the figure below. This figure 
shows that as long as the time spent in the green shortcut zones is less than 60 seconds, 
there is very little chance of a near miss. However, beyond 60 seconds the odds of a near 
miss occurring greatly increases with the amount of time spent in the green shortcut 
zones. 
Next, participants were shown a figure with the solid “high risk” line from Figure 2, along with 
the following text: 
During the High Risk trials, the relationship between the time spent in the green shortcut 
zones and the odds of a near miss occurring is shown in the figure below. This figure 
shows that the odds of a near miss occurring greatly increases with the amount of time 
spent in the green shortcut zones. Furthermore, beyond 60 seconds the odds of a near 
miss occurring is nearly 100% in the high risk trials. 
Finally, participants were shown a figure with both lines (i.e., the same as Figure 2), along with 
the following text: 
For example: 
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If aircraft spend 60 seconds in the green shortcut zones during a Low Risk trial, the odds 
of a near miss occurring is 7%. 
 
If aircraft spend 60 seconds in the green shortcut zones during a High Risk trial, the odds 
of a near miss occurring is 93%. 
Next, a “drawing marbles out of a hat” analogy was used to explain how a near miss was 
calculated. Specifically, participants were told to imagine a hat containing yellow marbles and 
red marbles. If they drew a yellow marble then no near miss occurred and they would be paid. 
Conversely, if they drew a red marble then a near miss did occur and they would not be paid. 
Thus, there was a random chance component to whether or not there was a near miss. However, 
participants’ behavior shifted the odds. The more they engaged in shortcut behavior, the more red 
marbles there were, relative to yellow marbles. Participants were shown several examples (e.g., 
“if you were in the green shortcut zone for X seconds the odds of a near miss would be…”) 
including pictures of yellow and red marbles to clearly communicate the odds. Participants were 
required to pass several knowledge checks indicating that they understood the compensation 
scheme before they could move on to the experimental trials. 
 Immediately following the experiment session (i.e., after the participant had performed 
the eight trials), a SAS program was run to compute whether a near miss had occurred during 
each trial. The SAS program mimicked the “pulling marbles from a hat” example. Specifically, 
the program performed the following functions: 
1. Computed the odds on a near miss for each of the eight experimental trials using 
Equations 1 and 2. This variable was converted into a percentage and rounded to the 
nearest integer. 
2. Generated a random number between 0 and 100 from a uniform distribution. If this 
random number was greater than the odds of a near miss computed in Step 1, then no 
near miss occurred and the participant was paid the money he or she had earned that trial. 
Conversely, if the random number was less than or equal to the odds of a near miss, then 
a near miss did occur and the participant was not paid any money for that trial. 
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As stated above, participants were not paid for trials during which a near miss occurred. Near 
misses were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis, meaning a near miss on one trial did not preclude 
earning money on another trial. Furthermore, near misses were not computed until the end of the 
experiment, meaning participants were not told that they had experienced a near miss until after 
they had performed all eight trials. This was done to avoid any effects that experiencing a near 
miss may have on risk perceptions, an issue we address directly in Study 2. The risk 
manipulation was represented in our analysis with an effect coded variable where -1 = low risk 
and 1 = high risk. 
Workload manipulation. Participants were also told about workload prior to each trial 
(and prior to reporting utility). Workload was manipulated by varying the presence vs. absence of 
outer aircraft. During the low workload trials there were four inner aircraft present; no outer 
aircraft were present. During the high workload trials there were four outer aircraft present, as 
well as the four inner aircraft present. Thus, there were more aircraft to land (i.e., more work to 
to) during the “high workload” trials compared to the “low workload” trials, yet the amount of 
time available was constant across the trials (105 seconds). During the low workload trials it was 
relatively easy to land all four inner aircraft without taking any shortcuts. In contrast, this was 
more challenging during the high workload trials. Participants still needed to land all four inner 
aircraft, yet to maximize their payments participants also needed to land as many outer aircraft as 
possible. Thus, when workload was high there was an incentive to take shortcuts. Before each 
trial participants were told whether the outer aircraft would be present. The workload 
manipulation was represented in our analysis with an effect coded variable where -1 = low 
workload and 1 = high workload. 
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Goal framing manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two goal 
framing conditions. The compensation structure was identical across conditions, such that 
participants in both conditions had efficiency goals (i.e., landing aircraft) and safety goals (i.e., 
avoiding a near miss). However, the conditions varied in terms of which goal was emphasized as 
an obligation. In the “safety is an obligation’ condition participants were told: 
As an air traffic controller, you have an obligation to be as safe as possible. 
It is your duty to ensure that as few aircraft as possible are involved in a “near miss” 
during the trial. 
Because this obligation is so important, the amount of money you earn during this study 
will be based on how many times aircraft under your control are involved in a near miss. 
Conversely, in “efficiency is an obligation” condition participants were told: 
As an air traffic controller, you have an obligation to be as efficient as possible. 
It is your duty to ensure that as many aircraft as possible reach their destinations by the 
end of the trial. 
Because this obligation is so important, the amount of money you earn during this study 
will be based on how many aircraft you are able to land. 
The goal frame manipulation was represented in our analysis with an effect coded variable where 
-1 = safety is an obligation and 1 = efficiency is an obligation. 
Measures.  
Manipulation checks. Time pressure was measured prior to each trial as a validity check 
of the workload manipulation. Two items were used: “During the upcoming trial I will be 
working under excessive time pressure” and “If given more time I could do better on the 
upcoming trial.” These items were originally developed by Durham, Locke, Poon, & McLeod 
(2000). Participants responded on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. The 
average Spearman-Brown corrected (n = 2) reliability across the eight trials was .81.  
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Risk perceptions were measured prior to each trial as a validity check of the risk 
manipulation. Two items were used: “Routing aircraft through the green shortcut zones will be 
very risky during the upcoming trial” and “Routing aircraft through the green shortcut zones 
during the upcoming trial involves more risk than I am comfortable with.” Participants 
responded on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. The average Spearman-
Brown corrected (n = 2) reliability across the eight trials was .84. 
Self-set goals were measured prior to each trial and were used as part of a validity check 
of the goal framing manipulation, which is described in greater detail in the Results section. 
Participants responded to two items which referred to their inner aircraft goals: “During the 
upcoming trial my goal is to land ____ inner aircraft” and “The minimum number of inner 
aircraft I’d be satisfied landing during the upcoming trial is ____.” Participants responded on a 
scale from zero aircraft to four aircraft. The average Spearman-Brown corrected (n = 2) 
reliability across the eight trials was .79. During the high workload trials participants also 
responded to the same two items, yet in reference to their outer aircraft goals. The average 
Spearman-Brown corrected (n = 2) reliability across these trials was .84. 
Focal measures. As stated above, shortcut behavior was operationalized as the amount 
of time aircraft spent flying through the “shortcut zones.” Perceived utility of engaging in 
shortcut behavior was measured before each trial using the following two items: “Routing 
aircraft through the green shortcut zones will pay off during the upcoming trial” and “Routing 
aircraft through the green shortcut zones will help me earn more money during the upcoming 
trial.” Participants responded on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. The 
average Spearman-Brown corrected (n = 2) reliability across the four trials was .95.   
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 Analysis plan. Because observations were nested within individuals, multi-level 
modeling (MLM; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) was implemented via SAS Proc Mixed (Singer, 
1998). Trial number had no statistically significant effect on perceived utility of taking shortcuts 
(F = .17, p = .990), nor actual shortcut behavior (F = 1.36, p = .221). Furthermore, controlling 
for trial number had no influence on the interpretation of our results. Thus, for parsimony, trial 
number is excluded from our analyses. Statistical significance of indirect effects was tested using 
Tofighi and MacKinnon’s (2011) RMediation macro. RMediation computes indirect effects by 
multiplying the regression weight derived when the intervening variable is regressed on the 
independent variable and the regression weight derived when the dependent variable is regressed 
on the intervening variable, controlling for the independent variable. Asymmetric confidence 
intervals are then estimated around the indirect effect to account for the skewed sampling 
distribution of indirect effects. 
Results 
 Manipulation checks. 
 Risk manipulation. As expected, participants reported higher risk perceptions during the 
high risk trials compared to the low risk trials (γ = .94, SE = .02, p < .001, d = 2.54). 
 Workload manipulation. Likewise, participants reported higher time pressure during the 
high workload trials compared to the low workload trials (γ = .10, SE = .02, p < .001, d = .30).  
 Goal frame manipulation. Lastly, to examine our goal frame manipulation, we used the 
goal frame variable to predict the slope between participants’ self-set outer aircraft goals and 
their self-set inner aircraft goals during the high workload trials. Specifically, participants were 
able to earn the most money by landing outer aircraft, but only if all of the inner aircraft were 
landed. As such, a positive relationship between outer aircraft goals and inner aircraft goals is to 
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be expected. When a person has a high outer aircraft goal, he or she would also be expected to 
have a high inner aircraft goal, or else landing outer aircraft would be largely futile.   
 However, the relationship between outer aircraft goals and inner aircraft goals should be 
stronger for individuals who perceive efficiency to be an obligation, and weaker for individuals 
who perceive safety to be an obligation. For instance, even though landing the inner aircraft is 
necessary to fully reap the rewards of landing a high number of outer aircraft, individuals who 
perceive safety as an obligation may be unwilling to “do whatever it takes” to land the inner 
aircraft, whereas individuals who perceive efficiency as an obligation may be more inclined to do 
so. In line with the reasoning, the goal frame manipulation significantly moderated the 
relationship between outer and inner aircraft goals (γ = .06, SE = .03, p < .05).2 As shown in 
Figure 3, when participants had higher outer aircraft goals they also set higher inner aircraft 
goals, yet this relationship was significantly stronger for individuals in the “efficiency is an 
obligation” condition, providing evidence for the validity of our goal frame manipulation. 
 Descriptive statistics. Means, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and intraclass 
correlations (ICC[1]) are shown in Table 1. ICC(1) represents the proportion of variance in a 
variable occurring at the between-person level of analysis. As shown in Table 1, both perceived 
utility of taking shortcuts actual shortcut behaviors varied at between- and within-person levels 
of analysis. These results justify our multi-level approach to data analysis. Correlations are 
reported at the between- and within-person levels of analysis separately, as nesting can make it 
difficult to interpret the direction, magnitude, and statistical significance of raw score 
correlations (Chen, Bliese, & Mathieu, 2005; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). However, as shown in 
Table 1, the correlation between perceived utility of taking shortcuts and actual shortcut behavior 
was similar across levels of analysis. Furthermore, disambiguating utility into between- vs. 
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within-person components via within-person centering (e.g., Hofmann & Gavin, 1998) before 
regressing shortcut behavior on utility had no influence on the interpretation of the hypothesis 
tests. As such, in the following section we simply report the results of the analyses using the raw 
score utility variable. 
 Hypothesis 1. H1 stated that the utility of shortcut behaviors would be positively related 
to actual shortcut behaviors. Initial support from this hypothesis comes from Table 1, as utility 
was positively correlated with shortcut behavior at both the between-person (r = .36, p < .001) 
and within-person (r = .39, p < .001) levels of analysis. Next, we regressed shortcut behaviors on 
the utility of shortcut behaviors using MLM. Importantly, we controlled for the three-way 
interaction between risk, workload, and goal framing, as well as all lower-order terms. This was 
done because it is necessary to control for these effects when testing the indirect effect in H3. As 
expected, utility continued to have a significant positive effect on shortcut behavior when these 
control variables were included (γ = 3.91, SE = .76, p < .001). Therefore, H1 was supported. 
 Hypothesis 2. H2 predicted a three-way interaction between risk, workload, and goal 
frame on the perceived utility of taking shortcuts. The results of the omnibus test are shown in 
Table 2. The use of effect coding allows for the interpretations of the main effects presented in 
this table. As expected, there was a negative main effect of risk (γ = -.60, SE = .05, p < .001, d = -
1.89), indicating that individuals perceived shortcuts to have less utility during the high risk 
trials, relative to the low risk trials. There was also a positive main effect of workload on utility 
(γ = .06, SE = .02, p < .01, d = .19). This main effect was not necessarily predicted, as workload 
was only expected to be positively related to utility when risks were high and for individuals for 
whom efficiency was framed as an obligation. Nonetheless, these main effects were qualified by 
a significant three-way interaction between risk, workload, and goal frame on utility (γ = .04, SE 
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= .02, p < .05). The interaction is plotted in Figure 4. To fully test H2 we further probed the 
three-way interaction by assessing the two-way interaction between workload and goal framing 
in the low risk trials vs. the high risk trials. These results are summarized in Table 3.  
 During the low risk trials there was a marginally significant main effect of workload on 
utility (γ = .05, SE = .03, p < .10, d = .16), and there was no two-way interaction between 
workload and goal frame. Thus, in general shortcuts held high utility during the low risk trials, 
with workload and goal framing having little influence on utility perceptions. In contrast, during 
the high risk trials there was a significant positive main effect of workload on utility (γ = .06, SE 
= .03, p < .05), and this main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between 
workload and goal framing (γ = .06, SE = .03, p < .05). Examination of the simple slopes 
indicated that during the high risk trials workload had no significant influence on utility for 
individuals for whom safety was framed as an obligation (γ = .00, SE = .04, p = .960, d = .00). 
Yet, for people for whom efficiency was framed as an obligation, workload had a positive effect 
on utility (γ = .12, SE = .04, p < .01, d = .39). In other words, individuals for whom efficiency 
was framed as an obligation were less sensitive to risk and more sensitive to workload when 
forming perceptions of the utility of taking shortcuts, relative to individuals for whom safety was 
framed as an obligation. Thus, in general the pattern of the three-way interaction was as 
predicted, meaning H2 was supported.   
 Hypothesis 3. Finally, H3 predicted a moderated indirect effect of workload on shortcut 
behaviors via utility, such that the indirect effect would be positive and strongest when risks are 
high and for individuals for whom efficiency is framed as an obligation. We tested this 
hypothesis using the simple slopes between workload and utility which were computed as part of 
the test of H2 (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). We also used the slope between utility and shortcut 
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behaviors that was computed as part of the test of H1. As shown in Table 4, there was a 
significant positive indirect effect of workload on shortcut behavior via utility, yet only during 
the high risk trials and only for individuals for whom efficiency was framed as an obligation. 
Conversely, during the low risk trials the confidence interval around the indirect effect contained 
zero, indicating that workload did not have a significant indirect effect on shortcut behavior. 
Similarly, during the high risk trials there was no significant indirect effect of workload on 
shortcut behavior for individuals for whom safety was framed as an obligation. This pattern of 
results indicates a moderated indirect effect, meaning H3 was supported.   
Discussion 
 In general, Study 1 provided support for our hypotheses. Individuals used utility 
perceptions to guide their decisions to take shortcuts while performing a work simulation task. 
These utility perceptions were affected by risk level, workload, and whether efficiency (versus 
safety) was framed as an obligation. When there was a great deal of work to accomplish in a 
relatively little amount of time, individuals for whom efficiency was an obligation were willing 
to take shortcuts to meet these demands, even when doing so was risky. This finding provides 
some important context to prior research on the link between regulatory focus and safety, which 
has tended to find that a prevention focus was associated with greater safety and lower 
productivity (e.g., Wallace & Chen, 2006; Wallace, Johnson, & Frazier, 2009). In those prior 
studies, regulatory focus was assessed as a general state possessed by individuals, akin to a 
domain-specific (i.e., workplace) personality trait. In absence of cues to the contrary, such an 
orientation may indeed lead to an emphasis on safety at the expense of productivity. However, 
our theorizing—supported by our results—indicate that the regulatory focus framing of safety 
and efficiency goals themselves can lead to a very different pattern of responses, in which the 
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presentation of efficiency as an obligation resulted in greater willingness to engage in risky 
shortcut behaviors. This is an important finding, as it indicates a set of conditions under which 
individuals are relatively insensitive to risk in assessing the utility of shortcuts. When efficiency 
is an obligation, shortcuts can maintain utility even when the risks are high. 
Although these results are encouraging, there are limitations of Study 1 that warrant 
discussion. Half of the participants were told that safety (i.e., avoiding risks) was an obligation, 
whereas the other half of the participants were told that efficiency (i.e., meeting performance 
goals) was an obligation. On the one hand this is a strength, as Study 1 allowed for a test of the 
effects of framing efficiency as an obligation on the tendency to take shortcuts, rather than 
inducing an obligation-framed mindset “in general” (cf. Wallace & Chen, 2006; Wallace et al., 
2009). Yet, a limitation of this design is that it is not possible to determine if the goal framing 
effects were driven by the “efficiency is an obligation” condition leading to increased utility 
under high risk and high workload conditions (as hypothesized), or if the results were driven by 
the “safety is an obligation” condition led to decreased utility. We address this limitation in 
Study 2 by telling half of the participants that efficiency was an obligation (as in Study 1), 
whereas the other half were told that efficiency was an opportunity. We chose this goal framing 
contrast given prior work showing that the same goal can be conceptualized as either an 
obligation versus opportunity and that opportunity goals are distinct from obligation goals 
(Higgins, 1997). Thus, in tandem, the two studies allow us to draw inferences about the effects of 
framing efficiency as an obligation on shortcut behaviors. 
A second potential limitation of Study 1 is that the risk associated with shortcuts was 
explicitly communicated to participants immediately before each experimental trial. This was 
done to facilitate high correspondence between objective risk and risk perceptions (cf. Slovic & 
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Peters, 2006). Although this was done to minimize the need for participants to make inferences 
regarding the riskiness of shortcuts, and thus ensure the internal validity of our risk manipulation, 
such information is often unavailable in the workplace. Rather, perceptions of risk often vary 
based on people’s salient experiences. For instance, Cree and Kelloway (1997) found that 
workers in a plastics manufacturing plant who had experienced an accident (either themselves or 
vicariously) perceived more risks in their work environment relative to employees who had not 
experienced an accident. In Study 2 we manipulated the salience of shortcut riskiness. The actual 
amount of risk associated with shortcut behaviors was constant from trial to trial, but we 
manipulated whether or not individuals had recently experienced a negative outcome, ostensibly 
as a result of shortcut behavior. This permits examination of the extent to which goal framing 
impacts reductions in shortcut behaviors immediately following the experience of negative 
outcomes, as well as the impact of goal framing on subsequent increases in shortcut behaviors 
during the time following the negative outcome.  
Study 2 
 Study 2 provides a conceptual replication and extension of Study 1. In addition to the 
design changes noted above, there was one additional notable change. Whereas in Study 1 
workload varied by trial, in Study 2 workload was high during all trials. We chose to focus on 
high workload situations as Study 1 indicated that individuals are most likely to engage in risky 
shortcut behaviors when workload is high. 
 As stated above, we varied the salience of risks by manipulating whether participants had 
recently experienced an adverse event. Past research has indicated that risks become more salient 
following adverse events, such as accidents and injuries (Cree & Kelloway, 1997). Similarly, 
experiencing an accident or injury has been shown to increase safety climate (i.e., beliefs about 
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the importance of safety); however, these effects tend to fade over time (Beus, Payne, Bergman, 
& Arthur, 2010). Likewise, Komaki et al. (1978) found that the effects of a safety intervention 
faded over time; after risks were no longer being made salient via feedback, shortcut behaviors 
increased. Therefore, we expect the salience of risks to increase following an adverse event, but 
for this salience to fade over time. Furthermore, because utility is expected to be negatively 
related to risks, we predict utility will follow a similar pattern. Specifically, utility is expected to 
decrease from baseline immediately following an adverse event, yet as the time elapsed since the 
adverse event increases, utility is expected to increase as well.  
 More importantly, we predict that the effects of experiencing an adverse event will be 
moderated by the way goals are framed (H4). Specifically, we expect individuals who see 
efficiency as an obligation to be less sensitive to the adverse event when forming utility 
perceptions, compared to individuals who see efficiency as an opportunity. As stated above, 
goals framed as obligations are seen as being very important (Higgins, 1997). These goals are 
often “shielded” from other goals, meaning resources are diverted away from other goals to 
ensure obligations goals are met (Shah et al., 2002), and individuals with a strong sense of 
obligation sometimes engage in highly risky behavior in order to ensure their goals are met 
(Scholer et al., 2010). Because shortcut behaviors are a means of accomplishing one’s efficiency 
goals, we expect individuals for whom efficiency is framed as an obligation to be less sensitive 
to risks following an adverse event when forming utility perceptions. This is because the 
obligation of maintaining efficiency is expected to be more important than other goals, such as 
minimizing one’s exposure to risks. For these individuals efficiency is a goal that must be met, 
even if it requires engaging in highly risky shortcut behaviors.  
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 This insensitivity to risks is expected to manifest in two ways. First, the decrease in 
utility following an adverse event is expected to be smaller (i.e., a shallower slope) for 
individuals for whom efficiency is an obligation, relative to individuals for whom efficiency is 
an opportunity (H4a). Second, the increase in utility following the adverse event is expected to 
be larger (i.e., a steeper slope) for individuals for whom efficiency is an obligation, relative to 
individuals for whom efficiency is an opportunity (H4b). 
 Finally, as with Study 1 we expect utility to be positively related to the actual amount of 
shortcut behavior in which individuals engage. Therefore, by extension we predict that the 
experience of an adverse event will have an indirect effect on shortcut behavior via utility, and 
that this indirect effect will be moderated by the way efficiency goals are framed (H5). 
Specifically, when comparing baseline trials to the trials immediately following an adverse event, 
shortcut behaviors are expected to decrease. This means we are predicting a negative indirect 
effect of experiencing an adverse event on shortcut behaviors via utility. In line with our 
predictions for H4, this indirect effect is expected to be stronger for individuals for whom 
efficiency is framed as an opportunity, relative to individuals for whom efficiency is framed as an 
obligation. Similarly, when comparing the trials immediately following an adverse event to the 
lagged trials shortcut behaviors are expected to increase, meaning we are predicting a positive 
indirect effect. Likewise, this indirect effect is expected to be stronger for individuals for whom 
efficiency is framed as an opportunity, compared to individuals for whom efficiency is framed as 
an obligation. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 144 undergraduate students from a mid-sized Canadian 
university.3 The sample was 55% female and had a mean age of 20.17 (SD = 1.97). Forty-seven 
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percent of the participants identified themselves as Asian, 32% of the sample identified 
themselves as Caucasian, and the remaining 21% identified other races. Participants were 
compensated with extra credit and the possibility to win a cash prize (described below). 
Procedure. Participants performed four trials of the ATC-labAdvanced task, yielding a total 
of 576 observations (144 participants × 4 trials). Both inner and outer aircraft were present 
during all trials in the current study. Also, for this study each experimental trial lasted 90 seconds 
(rather than 105 seconds, as was done in Study 1). It was possible, yet challenging, to land all of 
the aircraft in 90 seconds without taking shortcuts. Thus, all trials were performed under a high 
workload. Finally, participants were randomly assigned to one of two performance goal frame 
conditions (opportunity vs. obligation). We review this manipulation in detail below.  
Unlike Study 1, in the current study risk did not vary from trial to trial. Instead, during all 
trials there was a simple linear relationship between shortcut behavior and the odds of a near 
miss occurring. Specifically, the odds of a near miss occurring was equal to the number of 
seconds spent routing aircraft through the “shortcut” zones, plus five percent. The additional five 
percent was added so that the minimum odds of a near miss occurring were 5%, even if the 
participant did not engage in any shortcut behavior. It was clearly explained to participants that 
because air traffic control is inherently dangerous, there is always some risk of a near miss. Yet, 
this risk could be kept to a minimum by not taking shortcuts. 
Like Study 1, participants in this study were told they would not be paid any money for 
trials during which a near miss occurred, although they could still earn money on other trials 
(e.g., a near miss on Trial 1 did not preclude earning money during Trial 2). Also like Study 1, 
participants were told that whether or not there was a near miss was determined by a 
combination of the participant’s shortcut behavior and a random chance component. The same 
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“drawing marbles out of a hat” analogy was used to explain these odds in the current study. 
However, in reality participants were randomly assigned to experience a near miss following one 
of the trials. This manipulation is explained in detail below.  
Near miss manipulation. Unbeknownst to participants, whether or not a near miss 
occurred during a trial was manipulated. Participants were randomly assigned to receive 
feedback that they had been involved in a near miss following a specific trial, regardless of their 
actual behavior. One third of participants were told they had been involved in a near miss 
following Trial 1, one third of participants were told that they had been involved in a near miss 
following Trial 2, and one third of participants were told that they were told they had been 
involved in a near miss following Trial 3. This created three different “types” of trials: (1) 
baseline (prior to experiencing a near miss), (2) immediately after experiencing a near miss, and 
(3) lagged (after experiencing a near miss).  
Participant compensation and goal framing manipulation. Like Study 1, participants 
were told they would be paid based on the number of aircraft landed as well as whether or not 
there was a “near miss.” However, because near misses were manipulated in this study, and thus 
were not actually the result of participant behavior, the presence of a near miss did not actually 
affect the amount of money participants were paid. Instead, at the end of the experiment 
participants were debriefed regarding the purpose of the study. It was explained that the near 
miss they had experienced was predetermined and thus was not actually the result of their 
behavior. As such, participants were paid for all trials (assuming they had landed aircraft).  
At the onset of each trial there were four inner aircraft and four outer aircraft (see Figure 
1). However, in the current study participants were only paid for landing the outer aircraft, yet 
the amount of money each outer aircraft was worth depended on whether or not the participant 
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was able to land all four inner aircraft. Specifically, if all four inner aircraft were landed then 
each outer aircraft was worth $0.50, meaning a maximum of $2.00 could be earned per trial, and 
a maximum of $8.00 could be earned across the entire experiment. On the other hand, if three or 
fewer inner aircraft were landed, each outer aircraft was worth only $0.10.  
The manner in which the compensation scheme was explained to participants was used to 
manipulate the framing of the performance goal. Participants in the “efficiency is an 
opportunity” condition were given the following instructions: 
The Outer Aircraft are worth $0.10 apiece, meaning you will be paid ten cents for each 
Outer Aircraft you land.  
This means that if you land all 4 Outer Aircraft in a trial you’ll be paid $0.40 for the 
trial. Across all four trials, this means you can earn $1.60. 
However, you have an opportunity to increase the value of the Outer Aircraft to $0.50 
apiece by landing all 4 Inner Aircraft during a trial. 
This means that if you land all 4 Outer Aircraft in a trial, as well as all 4 Inner Aircraft, 
you’ll be paid $2.00 for the trial. Across all four trials, this means you can earn $8.00. 
In other words, you will gain money if you land all 4 Inner Aircraft, but you will not gain 
money if you do not land all 4 Inner Aircraft. 
Likewise, participants in the “efficiency is an obligation” condition were given the 
following instructions: 
If you land all 4 Inner Aircraft, the Outer Aircraft are worth $0.50 apiece, meaning you 
will be paid fifty cents for each Outer Aircraft you land.  
This means that if you land all 4 Outer Aircraft in a trial, as well as all 4 Inner Aircraft, 
you’ll be paid $2.00 for the trial. Across all four trials, this means you can earn $8.00. 
However, if you do not fulfill your obligation to land all 4 Inner Aircraft, the value of the 
Outer Aircraft is reduced to $0.10. 
This means that if you land all 4 Outer Aircraft in a trial, but not all 4 Inner Aircraft, 
you’ll be paid $0.40 for the trial. Across all four trials, this means you can earn $1.60. 
In other words, you will not lose money if you land all 4 Inner Aircraft, but you will lose 
money if you do not land all 4 Inner Aircraft. 
Shortcut Behaviors 31 
 
Thus, the compensation system was mathematically equivalent across goal framing conditions. 
Yet, adopting a common manipulation in the regulatory focus literature (e.g., Higgins, Shah, & 
Friedman, 1997), the incentives were framed differently. In the “opportunity” condition 
incentives were framed in terms of gains vs. non-gains, and the “opportunity” to gain money by 
landing all aircraft was emphasized. Conversely, in the “obligation” condition incentives were 
framed in terms of losses vs. non-losses, and the “obligation” to land all four inner aircraft was 
emphasized. The goal frame manipulation was represented in our analysis with an effect coded 
variable where -1 = efficiency is an opportunity and 1 = efficiency is an obligation. 
On average participants earned $2.41 (SD = $1.77, Min = $0.00, Max = $8.00). There 
were no main effects of the near miss configuration nor the performance goal framing 
manipulation on the amount of money earned (Fs < 1). However, participants in the “efficiency 
is an obligation” condition who experienced the near miss following Trial 1 earned slightly less 
than participants in the other cells (F = 3.34, p < .05).  
 Measures.  
 Manipulation checks. Risk perceptions were measured before each trial using the same 
two items that were used in Study 1. The average Spearman-Brown corrected (n = 2) reliability 
across the four trials was .67. Self-set goals were also measured prior to each trial in the same 
manner as was done in Study 1. The average Spearman-Brown corrected (n = 2) reliability across 
the four trials was .82 for inner aircraft goals and .82 for outer aircraft goals. 
 Focal measures. Shortcut behavior and perceived utility of taking shortcuts were 
measured in the same way as Study 1. The average Spearman-Brown corrected (n = 2) reliability 
for the utility measure was .79.   
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 Analysis plan. Similar to Study 1, MLM was used to account for the nested data. 
Although trial number had no statistically significant effect on perceived utility of taking 
shortcuts (F = .78, ns) when trial was the only predictor, trial number did have a significant effect 
on utility when trial type was also included (FTrialNumber = 4.29, p < .01; FTrialType = 14.37, p < 
.001). Furthermore, trial number had a significant effect on actual shortcut behavior (F = 5.68, p 
< .001). Therefore, trial number was included as a control variable in the hypothesis tests. Like 
Study 1, the significance of indirect effects were tested using Tofighi and MacKinnon’s (2011) 
RMediation macro.  
Results 
 Manipulation checks. 
 Near miss manipulation. On average, risk perceptions were above the midpoint of the 
scale before the near miss (M = 3.20, SD = .91), immediately following the near miss (M = 3.44, 
SD = .97), and during the post near miss trials (M = 3.22, SD = .95). Furthermore, risk 
perceptions were significantly predicted by trial type (F = 8.34, p < .001). Specifically, risk 
perceptions were equivalent during the baseline and lagged trials (i.e., before and after the near 
miss) (F = .01, ns), and risk perceptions were significantly higher immediately following the 
near miss (contrast = .24, SE = .06, p < .001, d = .40). Taken together these results indicate that 
individuals believed that engaging in shortcut behaviors carried some risk in the current study, 
and that experiencing a near miss increased the salience of risk perceptions. 
 Goal frame manipulation. As with Study 1, we assessed the validity of the goal frame 
manipulation by testing the moderating effect of goal frame on the relationship between self-set 
outer aircraft goals and self-set inner aircraft goals. The goal frame manipulation had a 
marginally significant moderating effect on the relationship between outer aircraft goals and 
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inner aircraft goals (γ = .05, SE = .03, p = .080). Furthermore, goal frame significantly moderated 
the squared effect of self-set outer aircraft goals on self-set inner aircraft goals (γ = -.08, SE = 
.02, p < .01).4 As shown in Figure 5, goal frame had the expected effect on the relationship 
between self-set outer aircraft goals on self-set inner aircraft goals, such that this relationship 
was generally stronger for individuals for whom efficiency was framed as an obligation. 
Descriptive statistics. Means, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and ICC(1)’s are 
shown in Table 5. As was done in Study 1 we reported between- and within-person correlations 
separately. Yet, for simplicity we report the results of the analyses using the raw score utility 
variable, as disambiguating utility into between- vs. within-person components does not change 
the interpretation of the hypothesis tests. 
 Hypothesis 4.  Hypothesis 4 predicted that the effects of the adverse event on utility 
would be moderated by goal framing. Specifically, Hypothesis 4a predicted a decrease in utility 
immediately following the adverse event, yet for this decrease to be smaller in magnitude for 
individuals for whom efficiency was framed as an obligation, relative to individuals for whom 
efficiency was framed as an opportunity. Likewise, Hypothesis 4b predicted that following an 
adverse event utility would increase, and that this slope would be steeper for individuals for 
whom efficiency is was framed as an obligation, relative to individuals for whom efficiency was 
framed as an opportunity. As expected, there was a significant omnibus interaction between trial 
type and goal framing (F = 3.05, p < .05).   
 As shown in Figure 6, utility perceptions decreased following the experience of the near 
miss. This decrease in utility occurred both for participants in the opportunity condition (γ = -.50, 
SE = .09, p < .001, d = -.81) and for participants in the obligation condition (γ = -.40, SE = .09, p 
< .001, d = -.66). However, the difference between these slopes was not statistically significant (γ 
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= -.09, SE = .13, ns), meaning Hypothesis 4a was not supported. Contrary to our prediction, 
individuals for whom efficiency was framed as an obligation were not less sensitive to the near 
miss when forming utility perceptions. On the other hand, whereas over time the utility of 
shortcut behavior increased for individuals for whom efficiency was framed as an obligation (γ = 
.30, SE = .10, p < .01, d = .50), utility did not significantly increase for individuals for whom 
efficiency was framed as an opportunity (γ = .06, SE = .10, ns). However, the difference between 
these slopes only reached marginal levels of statistical significant (γ = -.25, SE = .14, p = .084). 
Nonetheless, this pattern of results is in line with our prediction that individuals for whom 
efficiency was framed as an obligation would experience a more rapid increase in utility 
perceptions in the time following an adverse event. Therefore, Hypothesis 4b was supported. 
 Hypothesis 5.  Finally, we predicted that experiencing an adverse event would have an 
indirect effect on shortcut behavior via utility. To test this hypothesis, first we regressed shortcut 
behaviors on utility, controlling for all lower-order effects. As was the case in Study 1, utility was 
positively related to shortcut behavior (γ = 4.70, SE = 1.33, p < .001). Next, we computed the 
indirect effects of the near miss on shortcut behavior for both goal framing conditions using the 
simple slopes shown in Figure 6.  As shown in Table 6, experiencing the near miss resulted in 
reduced shortcut behavior during the trial immediately following the near miss. This was true for 
individuals in both goal framing conditions. That is, the 95% confidence interval around the 
indirect effect of the near miss on shortcut behavior did not include zero for either goal framing 
condition. Therefore, H5a was not supported. Yet, when comparing the trial immediately 
following the near miss to the lagged trials there was a significant positive indirect effect via 
utility, but only for individuals for whom efficiency was framed as an obligation. That is, 
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shortcut behavior increased following the near miss for individuals in the obligation condition, 
but not for individuals in the opportunity condition. These results support Hypothesis 5b. 
General Discussion 
Summary of Results 
 Past research has shown that shortcut behaviors are common, occurring even when doing 
so is known to be highly risky (e.g., Reader & O’Conner, 2014; Weyman & Clarke, 2003). Yet, 
this previous research provided little insight into why this might be the case and what could be 
done to curb high risk shortcut behaviors. Therefore, the current research contributes to the 
literature by providing insights into the reasons individuals sometimes engage in shortcut 
behaviors, even when doing so is known to be highly risky. Across two studies we demonstrated 
that subtle changes in the way efficiency goals are framed can influence decisions to engage in 
shortcut behaviors. Specifically, framing efficiency as an obligation resulted in less sensitivity to 
risk when forming perceptions of the utility of engaging in shortcut behaviors. As a result, 
individuals who saw efficiency as an obligation were more likely to turn to shortcut behaviors to 
manage high workloads, compared to individuals who saw safety as an obligation (Study 1) and 
individuals for whom efficiency was framed as an opportunity (Study 2). In Study 2 we further 
observed that after a brief reduction in shortcut behaviors immediately following first-hand 
experience with negative consequences resulting from such behaviors, those for whom efficiency 
was an obligation subsequently resumed their use of shortcut behaviors.  
Practical Implications 
 A potential practical implication of the current research is that framing efficiency goals as 
obligations may have unintended consequences for the work behaviors individuals choose. It is 
important to note that job performance is typically defined as the actions or behaviors in which a 
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worker engages, rather than the results or outcomes of those actions (Beck, Beatty, & Sackett, 
2014; Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993; Motowidlo & Kell, 2013). Furthermore, there 
are often multiple means to achieve a goal, meaning a number of different behaviors may be used 
to achieve the same results or outcomes (e.g., Huang & Zhang, 2013; Kruglanski, Pierro, & 
Sheveland, 2011). However, organizations are often primarily concerned with results, rather than 
behaviors (Aguinis & O’Boyle, 2014). This emphasis on results may set the stage for highly 
risky shortcut behaviors. Organizations that communicate that employees are obligated to obtain 
specific results (e.g., sales quotas, production quotas, on-time percentages) may be inadvertently 
communicating that employees are required to use whatever means are necessary to obtain the 
results, even if this includes engaging in highly risky shortcut behaviors.  
 Therefore, an important and practical implication of the current research is that 
organizations and managers should be aware that framing goals as obligations may have 
unanticipated and unintended consequences. The potential for goals and incentives to be 
interpreted more narrowly than intended is well recognized (e.g., Kerr, 1995; Ordonez, 
Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009; Wright, 1994). It may be feasible to simultaneously 
encourage an obligation towards efficiency and a strong commitment to safety, although doing 
so may prove challenging without overtaxing individuals time and attentional resources and, 
thus, nonetheless prompting trade-offs of one goal for the other (e.g., Schmidt & Dolis, 2009).  
Theoretical Implications 
 In past research shortcut behaviors have been included as indicators of unsafe or 
otherwise counterproductive behavior (e.g., Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, & Smith-Crowe, 2002; 
Sackett, 2002). However, we argue that shortcut behaviors are not redundant with these broader 
concepts and as such are worthy of study in their own right. Although we agree that some 
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shortcut behaviors can fit the definitions of unsafe behaviors (i.e., endangering health and 
physical well-being) and counterproductive work behavior (i.e., against the organization’s 
legitimate interests), shortcut behaviors are not necessarily unsafe or counterproductive. Rather, 
fundamentally, shortcut behaviors are simply means of saving time; the degree to which they are 
beneficial or harmful is dependent on context. Indeed, in some cases finding new and faster ways 
to perform one’s work tasks is actually considered to be one of the hallmarks of proactive work 
behavior (e.g., Griffin, Neal, & Parker, 2007). By acknowledging that shortcut behaviors are not 
inherently unsafe or counterproductive, it becomes possible to separate shortcut behaviors from 
value judgements. By doing so the current research provides insights into the reasons individuals 
may continue to engage in shortcut behaviors, even when doing so is risky.  
 The current manuscript may also have implications for the broader work motivation 
literature. Evidence from this literature indicates that individuals are highly attuned to their rate 
of progress while pursing goals (e.g., Johnson et al., 2012). As such, looking for faster ways to 
accomplish one’s goals may be a fundamental motivational process, and engaging in shortcut 
behaviors may often be a readily available way to increase rate of progress. A potentially fruitful 
area for future research is to consider how individuals use shortcut behaviors to regulate velocity. 
Importantly, slow velocity can result in negative emotions and dissatisfaction (Chang, Johnson, 
& Lord, 2010; Lawrence, Carver, & Scheier, 2002). Furthermore, negative emotions may restrict 
attention (Friedman & Förster, 2010), leading individuals to be less attentive to the risks 
involved with shortcut behaviors and instead to be focus on increasing velocity. Therefore, 
individuals may be particularly vulnerable to engaging in high-risk shortcut behaviors at times 
when goal progress is slow.  
Strengths and Limitations 
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 The laboratory approach used in the current research has two important strengths. First, 
by using a laboratory paradigm we were able to directly and unobtrusively observe shortcut 
behavior, as opposed to field research where such behaviors would generally need to be 
measured or inferred from outcomes (e.g., accidents). Inferring behaviors from outcomes can be 
difficult because outcomes like accidents are low base rate events (e.g., Zohar, 2000) and often 
shortcut behaviors do not result in a discrete outcome like an accident. Also, measuring shortcut 
behaviors may be difficult as individuals underreport behaviors perceived to be undesirable due 
to fear of repercussions (Berry, Carpenter, & Barratt, 2012; Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008). 
Thus, the direct observation of such behaviors is an important strength of the current manuscript. 
 Second, workload, risks, and sense of obligation to efficiency were manipulated in the 
current research. As such, we were able to make stronger inferences regarding causality than 
could be made using other designs. For instances, workplaces characterized by high workloads 
may also be workplaces where it is more likely that efficiency goals would be framed as 
obligations. In this case, it would be more difficult to disentangle the independent effect of these 
factors on utility and shortcut behaviors. By manipulating independent variables in the current 
research we are able to say that high workloads and framing efficiency goals as obligations can 
cause utility perceptions associated with shortcut behaviors to become less affected by risk. Yet, 
the applied setting to which this process will generalize is a question for future research. 
 Specifically, the primary limitation of the laboratory paradigm is the degree to which our 
results will generalize to organizational settings; this is a question that needs to be addressed in 
future research. One potentially important distinction between the current research and many 
applied settings is that the stakes were relatively low in the current research (up to $10 of 
remuneration), whereas the stakes may be much higher in workplace contexts. For instance, 
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failing to meet one’s workload demands could result in poor performance reviews, lack of pay 
increases, lack of advancement opportunities, demotion, or even termination. Likewise, the risks 
associated with shortcut behaviors may be much more severe, such as suffering a workplace 
accident resulting in injury or even death. It is not immediately clear what influence these 
changes in stakes may have on shortcut behaviors. Although it might be reasonable to predict 
that individuals would be more wary about engaging in shortcut behaviors when potential 
negative outcomes are very severe (e.g., an accident), these effects may be outweighed by the 
higher stakes associated with meeting workload demands. Nonetheless, in general we expect the 
process by which individuals form perceptions of the utility of engaging in shortcut behaviors to 
be largely the same in an applied context as in the laboratory. In both contexts, we expect 
shortcut behaviors to be driven by utility, and for utility perceptions to be a function of the 
anticipated “pros” and “cons” associated with shortcut behaviors.  
Conclusions 
  Given the demands inherent in many workplaces, it is not surprising that employees look 
for ways to save time. Because the risks associated with shortcut behaviors are often low, taking 
a shortcut may sometimes be a reasonable strategy to manage a demanding workload. Yet, 
problems can arise when workers turn to shortcut behaviors to manage high workloads when 
doing so is very risky. In the current manuscript we sought to understand this phenomenon. We 
showed that framing efficiency goals are obligations may lead individuals to overlook the risks 
involved and to see shortcuts as a viable option for managing high workloads. Hopefully this 
insight can be used to guide managers and organizations to carefully consider how the manner in 
which efficiency goals are communicated can affect workers decisions to engage in high-risk 
shortcut behaviors.   
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and ICC(1) for Study 1 
 
Notes:  †p < .10, ***p < .001. Within-person correlations (based on n = 968 observations) shown 
below the diagonal. Between-person (based on N = 121 participants) correlations shown above 
the diagonal. 
1 2 3 4 5
1. Risk ― ― ― ―
2. Workload .00 ― ― ―
3. Goal frame ― ― -.02 .15 †
4. Utility of shortcuts -.61 *** .06 † ― .36 ***
5. Shortcut behavior -.48 *** -.04 ― .39 ***
Mean ― ― ― 3.26 1.12
SD ― ― ― 34.23 30.19
ICC(1) ― ― ― .12 .48
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Table 2 
Three-way Interaction of Risk, Workload, and Goal Frame on Perceived Utility of Shortcut 
Behavior in Study 1 
 
Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. n = 968 observations nested within N = 121 participants.
γ SE t
Risk -.60 .05 -12.31 ***
Workload .06 .02 2.78 **
Goal Frame -.01 .05 -.26
Risk × Workload .01 .02 .27
Risk × Goal Frame .05 .05 1.04
Workload × Goal Frame .02 .02 .90
Risk  × Workload × Goal Frame .04 .02 2.06 *
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Table 3 
Probing Three-way Interaction in Study 1 
 
Notes: †p < .10, *p < .05. n = 968 observations nested within N = 121 participants.
γ SE t
Low Risk Trials
Workload .05 .03 1.85 †
Goal Frame -.06 .05 -1.17
Workload × Goal Frame -.02 .03 -.85
High Risk Trials
Workload .06 .03 2.07 *
Goal Frame .04 .08 .47
Workload × Goal Frame .06 .03 2.00 *
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Table 4 
Moderated Indirect Effect of Workload on Shortcut Behavior via Utility in Study 1 
 
Notes: n = 968 observations nested within N = 121 participants.  LB = lower bound of 95% confidence interval. UB = upper bound of 
95% confidence interval.
γ SE γ SE Effect LB UB
Low Risk Trials
Safety is an obligation .07 .04 3.91 .76 .27 -.03 .63
Efficiency is an obligation .03 .04 3.91 .76 .12 -.19 .45
High Risk Trials
Safety is an obligation .00 .04 3.91 .76 .00 -.32 .32
Efficiency is an obligation .12 .04 3.91 .76 .47 .15 .87
Workload → Utility Utility → Shortcut 
Behavior
Indirect Effect
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Table 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and ICC(1) for Study 2 
 
Notes:  Within-person correlations (based on n = 576 observations) shown below the diagonal. 
Between-person (based on N = 144 participants) correlations shown above the diagonal. 
1 2 3 4 5
1. Trial Type Dummy 1 ― ― ― ―
2. Trial Type Dummy 2 -.59 *** ― ― ―
3. Goal frame ― ― -.10 -.07
4. Utility of shortcuts .10 * .08 * ― .27 **
5. Shortcut behavior -.08 † .08 † ― .15 ***
Mean ― ― ― 3.37 .88
SD ― ― ― 36.06 27.58
ICC(1) ― ― ― .48 .47
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Table 6 
Moderated Indirect Effect of an Adverse Event on Shortcut Behavior via Utility in Study 2 
 
Notes: n = 576 observations nested within N = 144 participants.  LB = lower bound of 95% confidence interval. UB = upper bound of 
95% confidence interval.
γ SE γ SE Effect LB UB
Baseline (before) → Immediately after near miss
Efficiency is an Opportunity -.50 .09 4.70 1.33 -2.33 -4.01 -.94
Efficiency is an Obligation -.40 .09 4.70 1.33 -1.89 -3.41 -.70
Immediately after near miss → Lagged (after) 
Efficiency is an Opportunity .06 .10 4.70 1.33 .28 -.65 1.31
Efficiency is an Obligation .30 .10 4.70 1.33 1.43 .37 2.87
Near Miss → Utility Utility → Shortcut 
Behavior
Indirect Effect
Shortcut Behaviors 50 
 
 
Figure 1.  Labeled screenshot of ATC-labAdvanced task. 
Note: The task is shown in color on participants’ monitors.
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Figure 2. Relationships between the time participants spent engaging in shortcut behavior during 
low- and high-risk trials and the odds of experiencing a near miss in Study 1. 
 
Note: Although trials lasted 105 seconds, time spent it shortcut zones could exceed 105 seconds. 
This is because there were multiple aircraft, and time spent in shortcut cones was tallied for each 
aircraft.
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Figure 3. Study 1 manipulation check: goal frame moderates the relationship between self-set 
outer aircraft goals and self-set inner aircraft goals. 
 
Note: ***p < .001
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Figure 4. Three-way interaction of risk, workload, and goal frame on utility in Study 1. 
Notes: †p < .10, **p < .01. 
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Figure 5. Study 2 manipulation check: goal frame moderates the curvilinear relationship between 
self-set outer aircraft goals and self-set inner aircraft goals.
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Figure 6. Goal frame moderates the effects of experiencing an adverse event on perceived utility 
of taking shortcuts in Study 2. 
 
Notes: **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Footnotes 
1 Final payments were rounded up to the nearest $0.25. 
 
2 The nature of this interaction does not change (nor do statistical significance levels) when risk level is included as 
a control variable. Furthermore, risk level does not moderate this effect (γ = .00, SE = .02, p = .896). 
 
3 There were initially 160 participants in the sample, but 16 participants received impossible feedback on at least one 
trial. These participants engaged in at least 95 seconds of shortcut behavior, which resulted in a 100% chance of a 
near miss. Yet, because the experience of a near miss was manipulated, in most cases these participants were told 
they did not experience a near miss. Thus, these participants were excluded from our analyses. Nonetheless, 
including these participants does not change the interpretation of our results. 
 
4 Lower-order main effects and interactions were included as control variables. These results do not change when 
trial type is included as a control variable, nor does trial type moderate this interaction  (F = .20, p = .819) 
                                                          
